/*
* Copyright (c) 2018 Thomas Pornin
*
* Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
* a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
* "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
* without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
* distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
* permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
* the following conditions:
*
* The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
* included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
* EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
* NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
* BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
* CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
* SOFTWARE.
*/
#include "inner.h"
/* see bearssl_rsa.h */
size_t
br_rsa_i15_compute_privexp(void *d,
const br_rsa_private_key *sk, uint32_t e)
{
/*
* We want to invert e modulo phi = (p-1)(q-1). This first
* requires computing phi, which is easy since we have the factors
* p and q in the private key structure.
*
* Since p = 3 mod 4 and q = 3 mod 4, phi/4 is an odd integer.
* We could invert e modulo phi/4 then patch the result to
* modulo phi, but this would involve assembling three modulus-wide
* values (phi/4, 1 and e) and calling moddiv, that requires
* three more temporaries, for a total of six big integers, or
* slightly more than 3 kB of stack space for RSA-4096. This
* exceeds our stack requirements.
*
* Instead, we first use one step of the extended GCD:
*
* - We compute phi = k*e + r (Euclidean division of phi by e).
* If public exponent e is correct, then r != 0 (e must be
* invertible modulo phi). We also have k != 0 since we
* enforce non-ridiculously-small factors.
*
* - We find small u, v such that u*e - v*r = 1 (using a
* binary GCD; we can arrange for u < r and v < e, i.e. all
* values fit on 32 bits).
*
* - Solution is: d = u + v*k
* This last computation is exact: since u < r and v < e,
* the above implies d < r + e*((phi-r)/e) = phi
*/
uint16_t tmp[4 * ((BR_MAX_RSA_FACTOR + 14) / 15) + 12];
uint16_t *p, *q, *k, *m, *z, *phi;
const unsigned char *pbuf, *qbuf;
size_t plen, qlen, u, len, dlen;
uint32_t r, a, b, u0, v0, u1, v1, he, hr;
int i;
/*
* Check that e is correct.
*/
if (e < 3 || (e & 1) == 0) {
return 0;
}
/*
* Check lengths of p and q, and that they are both odd.
*/
pbuf = sk->p;
plen = sk->plen;
while (plen > 0 && *pbuf == 0) {
pbuf ++;
plen --;
}
if (plen < 5 || plen > (BR_MAX_RSA_FACTOR / 8)
|| (pbuf[plen - 1] & 1) != 1)
{
return 0;
}
qbuf = sk->q;
qlen = sk->qlen;
while (qlen > 0 && *qbuf == 0) {
qbuf ++;
qlen --;
}
if (qlen < 5 || qlen > (BR_MAX_RSA_FACTOR / 8)
|| (qbuf[qlen - 1] & 1) != 1)
{
return 0;
}
/*
* Output length is that of the modulus.
*/
dlen = (sk->n_bitlen + 7) >> 3;
if (d == NULL) {
return dlen;
}
p = tmp;
br_i15_decode(p, pbuf, plen);
plen = (p[0] + 15) >> 4;
q = p + 1 + plen;
br_i15_decode(q, qbuf, qlen);
qlen = (q[0] + 15) >> 4;
/*
* Compute phi = (p-1)*(q-1), then move it over p-1 and q-1 (that
* we do not need anymore). The mulacc function sets the announced
* bit length of t to be the sum of the announced bit lengths of
* p-1 and q-1, which is usually exact but may overshoot by one 1
* bit in some cases; we readjust it to its true length.
*/
p[1] --;
q[1] --;
phi = q + 1 + qlen;
br_i15_zero(phi, p[0]);
br_i15_mulacc(phi, p, q);
len = (phi[0] + 15) >> 4;
memmove(tmp, phi, (1 + len) * sizeof *phi);
phi = tmp;
phi[0] = br_i15_bit_length(phi + 1, len);
len = (phi[0] + 15) >> 4;
/*
* Divide phi by public exponent e. The final remainder r must be
* non-zero (otherwise, the key is invalid). The quotient is k,
* which we write over phi, since we don't need phi after that.
*/
r = 0;
for (u = len; u >= 1; u --) {
/*
* Upon entry, r < e, and phi[u] < 2^15; hence,
* hi:lo < e*2^15. Thus, the produced word k[u]
* must be lower than 2^15, and the new remainder r
* is lower than e.
*/
uint32_t hi, lo;
hi = r >> 17;
lo = (r << 15) + phi[u];
phi[u] = br_divrem(hi, lo, e, &r);
}
if (r == 0) {
return 0;
}
k = phi;
/*
* Compute u and v such that u*e - v*r = GCD(e,r). We use
* a binary GCD algorithm, with 6 extra integers a, b,
* u0, u1, v0 and v1. Initial values are:
* a = e u0 = 1 v0 = 0
* b = r u1 = r v1 = e-1
* The following invariants are maintained:
* a = u0*e - v0*r
* b = u1*e - v1*r
* 0 < a <= e
* 0 < b <= r
* 0 <= u0 <= r
* 0 <= v0 <= e
* 0 <= u1 <= r
* 0 <= v1 <= e
*
* At each iteration, we reduce either a or b by one bit, and
* adjust u0, u1, v0 and v1 to maintain the invariants:
* - if a is even, then a <- a/2
* - otherwise, if b is even, then b <- b/2
* - otherwise, if a > b, then a <- (a-b)/2
* - otherwise, if b > a, then b <- (b-a)/2
* Algorithm stops when a = b. At that point, the common value
* is the GCD of e and r; it must be 1 (otherwise, the private
* key or public exponent is not valid). The (u0,v0) or (u1,v1)
* pairs are the solution we are looking for.
*
* Since either a or b is reduced by at least 1 bit at each
* iteration, 62 iterations are enough to reach the end
* condition.
*
* To maintain the invariants, we must compute the same operations
* on the u* and v* values that we do on a and b:
* - When a is divided by 2, u0 and v0 must be divided by 2.
* - When b is divided by 2, u1 and v1 must be divided by 2.
* - When b is subtracted from a, u1 and v1 are subtracted from
* u0 and v0, respectively.
* - When a is subtracted from b, u0 and v0 are subtracted from
* u1 and v1, respectively.
*
* However, we want to keep the u* and v* values in their proper
* ranges. The following remarks apply:
*
* - When a is divided by 2, then a is even. Therefore:
*
* * If r is odd, then u0 and v0 must have the same parity;
* if they are both odd, then adding r to u0 and e to v0
* makes them both even, and the division by 2 brings them
* back to the proper range.
*
* * If r is even, then u0 must be even; if v0 is odd, then
* adding r to u0 and e to v0 makes them both even, and the
* division by 2 brings them back to the proper range.
*
* Thus, all we need to do is to look at the parity of v0,
* and add (r,e) to (u0,v0) when v0 is odd. In order to avoid
* a 32-bit overflow, we can add ((r+1)/2,(e/2)+1) after the
* division (r+1 does not overflow since r < e; and (e/2)+1
* is equal to (e+1)/2 since e is odd).
*
* - When we subtract b from a, three cases may occur:
*
* * u1 <= u0 and v1 <= v0: just do the subtractions
*
* * u1 > u0 and v1 > v0: compute:
* (u0, v0) <- (u0 + r - u1, v0 + e - v1)
*
* * u1 <= u0 and v1 > v0: compute:
* (u0, v0) <- (u0 + r - u1, v0 + e - v1)
*
* The fourth case (u1 > u0 and v1 <= v0) is not possible
* because it would contradict "b < a" (which is the reason
* why we subtract b from a).
*
* The tricky case is the third one: from the equations, it
* seems that u0 may go out of range. However, the invariants
* and ranges of other values imply that, in that case, the
* new u0 does not actually exceed the range.
*
* We can thus handle the subtraction by adding (r,e) based
* solely on the comparison between v0 and v1.
*/
a = e;
b = r;
u0 = 1;
v0 = 0;
u1 = r;
v1 = e - 1;
hr = (r + 1) >> 1;
he = (e >> 1) + 1;
for (i = 0; i < 62; i ++) {
uint32_t oa, ob, agtb, bgta;
uint32_t sab, sba, da, db;
uint32_t ctl;
oa = a & 1; /* 1 if a is odd */
ob = b & 1; /* 1 if b is odd */
agtb = GT(a, b); /* 1 if a > b */
bgta = GT(b, a); /* 1 if b > a */
sab = oa & ob & agtb; /* 1 if a <- a-b */
sba = oa & ob & bgta; /* 1 if b <- b-a */
/* a <- a-b, u0 <- u0-u1, v0 <- v0-v1 */
ctl = GT(v1, v0);
a -= b & -sab;
u0 -= (u1 - (r & -ctl)) & -sab;
v0 -= (v1 - (e & -ctl)) & -sab;
/* b <- b-a, u1 <- u1-u0 mod r, v1 <- v1-v0 mod e */
ctl = GT(v0, v1);
b -= a & -sba;
u1 -= (u0 - (r & -ctl)) & -sba;
v1 -= (v0 - (e & -ctl)) & -sba;
da = NOT(oa) | sab; /* 1 if a <- a/2 */
db = (oa & NOT(ob)) | sba; /* 1 if b <- b/2 */
/* a <- a/2, u0 <- u0/2, v0 <- v0/2 */
ctl = v0 & 1;
a ^= (a ^ (a >> 1)) & -da;
u0 ^= (u0 ^ ((u0 >> 1) + (hr & -ctl))) & -da;
v0 ^= (v0 ^ ((v0 >> 1) + (he & -ctl))) & -da;
/* b <- b/2, u1 <- u1/2 mod r, v1 <- v1/2 mod e */
ctl = v1 & 1;
b ^= (b ^ (b >> 1)) & -db;
u1 ^= (u1 ^ ((u1 >> 1) + (hr & -ctl))) & -db;
v1 ^= (v1 ^ ((v1 >> 1) + (he & -ctl))) & -db;
}
/*
* Check that the GCD is indeed 1. If not, then the key is invalid
* (and there's no harm in leaking that piece of information).
*/
if (a != 1) {
return 0;
}
/*
* Now we have u0*e - v0*r = 1. Let's compute the result as:
* d = u0 + v0*k
* We still have k in the tmp[] array, and its announced bit
* length is that of phi.
*/
m = k + 1 + len;
m[0] = (2 << 4) + 2; /* bit length is 32 bits, encoded */
m[1] = v0 & 0x7FFF;
m[2] = (v0 >> 15) & 0x7FFF;
m[3] = v0 >> 30;
z = m + 4;
br_i15_zero(z, k[0]);
z[1] = u0 & 0x7FFF;
z[2] = (u0 >> 15) & 0x7FFF;
z[3] = u0 >> 30;
br_i15_mulacc(z, k, m);
/*
* Encode the result.
*/
br_i15_encode(d, dlen, z);
return dlen;
}